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On Emotions and the Politics
of Attention in Judicial Reasoning
EMILY KIDD WHITE*

I. Introduction
…
If you catch him,
Hold up a fashlight to his eye. It’s all dark pupil,
an entire night itself, whose haired horizon tightens
as he stares back, and closes up the eye. Ten from the lids
one tear, his only possession, like the bee’s sting, slips.
Slyly he palms it, and if you’re not paying attention
he’ll swallow it. However, if you watch, he’ll hand it over,
cool as from underground springs and pure enough to drink.
‘Man-Moth’, Elizabeth Bishop, Te Complete Poems 1926–1979

Legal doctrine regularly requires judges to both understand and use emotions in
diferent ways.1 Tis chapter explores the role of emotions in fxing and sustaining
judicial attention on the impact of a law on the constitutional rights of an individual or group.2 Tat certain forms of wrong or harm, including forms of political
* Tis chapter was presented at the ‘Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Legal Reasoning’ colloquium, convened by Amalia Amaya and Maksymilian Del Mar at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma
de México. Te author was grateful for the invitation and also to the participants and conveners, for
their deep and incisive comments. An early draf was presented at New York University School of Law
with Samuel Schefer ofering a series of pressing questions as the forum commentator, at the PULSE
lecture series convened by Gerry Simpson at the London School of Economics, and at a panel at the
Law and Society Association annual meeting in Toronto, convened by the head of the Law and Emotion
Collaborative Research Network, Susan Bandes. Te chapter beneftted a great deal from these interactions, and also from discussions with Jeremy Waldron.
1 See White (forthcoming).
2 Tis analysis is relevant to those constitutional law regimes where a law or government action can
violate a constitutional right not only in purpose, but in efect. Judicial considerations of the impact
or efects of the impugned law or government act can occur at the stage of the analysis where it is
determined whether a right has been violated, and/or at the stage of the analysis where the judge must
determine whether a violation is justifed via a proportionality analysis. See eg White (2014), and
Huscrof, Miller and Webber (2014).
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and social exclusion, are difcult to detect in the absence of focused attention is,
I think, what Elizabeth Bishop’s poem ‘Man-Moth’, excerpted here in epigraph,
intends to express. Tis chapter explores the role of emotions in setting up the
serious, sustained inquiry into the impact of a law on the constitutionally guaranteed rights of an individual or group that is required under various legal regimes.
When named, this emotional aspect of legal reasoning is ofen relayed as a call for
judicial empathy,3 but, as this chapter aims to show, this is neither a sufcient nor
apt description of the emotionally-laden, political practice of fxing one’s attention
on a subject.4 Drawing on the philosophy of emotion,5 we can sketch, for example,
various ways in which judicial attempts to pay attention to the claimant might go
awry such that they prove anathema to core legal values,6 or fail to comport with
the professional demands on the practicing judge in the adjudication of a constitutional rights case. Tis chapter aims to bring this aspect of legal reasoning more
clearly into focus by delineating a series of ill versions of judicial attention, and so
too by recognising some persistent problems with the related concept of judicial
empathy, which can be roughly defned as the attempt to enter either the mind or
situation of the person before the court.7
Iris Murdoch called the process of imagining a ‘moral discipline of the mind’,
an efort comparable to that ‘of “composing” and “holding” a difcult work of art
in one’s attention’.8 Te focus of this chapter is on precisely these kinds of eforts
of attention that are involved in legal reasoning, and its principal task is to explore
how emotions motivate and facilitate the kind of attention necessary to ascertain
whether a legal commitment to a right has been violated. Emotions play an integral role in the form of attention that judges must, as a matter of law, pay to the
claimant in a rights case.9 For, as the chapter concludes, certain forms of constitutional reasoning require from judges a certain politics of attention (meaning here
the conscientious and efortful attempt to both pay attention and efectuate a principled distribution of attention) in which emotions play indispensable roles.

3 See

eg Breyer (2013) and Leben (2011).
chapter in this volume (chapter ten) ofers an invaluable discussion on the complex difculty of defning empathy in the context of judicial reasoning (Kind, 2020).
5 See eg Goldie (2010), Blum (1980), De Sousa (1987), Leighton (1985), Leighton (2003), Abrams
and Keren (2010), Solomon (1988), Solomon (1977), Nussbaum (1996) and Nussbaum (2001).
6 As Jeremy Waldron writes, ‘A legal system is a normative order, both explicitly and implicitly.
Explicitly it commits itself publicly to certain rules and standards. Some of these it upholds and
enforces, but for others, in certain regards, it fails to do so. Te explicit content of the norms recognised
by the legal system provides us with a pretty straightforward basis for saying, on these occasions, that
the legal systems has fallen short of its own standards, without necessarily licensing the cynical conclusion that these were not its standards’. Waldron (2012a), 65–66.
7 For a deeper discussion on this, see Kind (2020) (chapter ten in this volume).
8 Murdoch (1993), 322. For a rich application of the philosophy of Iris Murdoch to the practice of
judicial reasoning, see van Domselaar (2020) (chapter fve in this volume).
9 Tis chapter aims only to set to light on the overlooked emotional aspects of the judicial reasoning
prescribed under some constitutional regimes (questions that set aside how this all bears out in practice). An inquiry which leaves open the possibility of distinct, even potentially competing, sets of moral
or political reasons to use emotions to interact with rights claimants in other ways.
4 Kind’s
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II. Two Legal Reasons for Paying Attention
Tere are diferent sorts of ethical and political reasons for fxing one’s attention on
a subject, which may or may not comport with the legal reasons that judges have
for doing so.10 Parsing out the legal reasons for judges to pay attention to claimants opens space for asking whether a legal system can deliver on the standards to
which it has been publicly committed. Wholesale prescriptions of emotions to the
judicial role pay insufcient attention to the normative situation of the law (altered
necessarily by its public, institutional and coercive aspects),11 and fail to heed to
both the political quality, and the structure of specifc legal regimes (eg judicial
empathy might be required at certain stages of a constitutional rights analysis, but
unsuitable to judicial reasoning at certain stages of criminal law sentencing).12
Tis chapter focuses only on the emotional aspects of judicial reasoning that are
required under a particular set of constitutional regimes, where judges work to
determine whether the impact of a law on an individual or group amounts to a
rights violation, and/or whether this violation might be justifed under a form of
proportionality reasoning.13 Te constitutional systems in mind have two general
features. First, a normative or political conception of the human person that serves
as a foundational constitutional value (for the last ffy years or so, we have seen
the concept of human dignity frequently take this place in a number of constitutional law regimes).14 Second, the concern here is with those legal systems that
consider the impact, or efect, of a law or government action when determining
whether the constitutional rights of an individual or group have been violated.15
Together, these two features ofer distinct sets of role-based reasons for judges to
pay a specifc sort of attention – one that evidences respect and concern – to the
person in the well of the court bringing forth a rights claim. Te assumption that
the legal values underpinning the constitutional system demand that respect be
shown to the claimant, is related but distinct from the need to ascertain a technical and/or strictly cognitive understanding of the law’s impact on the claimant’s
constitutional rights. Tis is because judges have role-based reasons to see human

10 On legal reasoning as a distinct form of reasoning, see MacCormick (1978), and, in particular,
chapter IX ‘Legal Reasoning and Legal Teory’.
11 Te point here is simply that an emotion that facilitates perception, right action, and/or virtuous
activity in daily life won’t necessarily have the same efect in the context of adjudication. Te social,
political, and coercive aspects of law alter the ethical landscape.
12 A recurring theme in the emerging law and emotions scholarship is the concern with breaking down overly general claims about both emotion and law, highlighting the need to study specifc
emotions within the context of specifc legal regimes. See eg White (2014), Maroney (2006) and Bandes
(1999).
13 Eg Huscrof, Webber and Miller (2014).
14 See eg Waldron (2012a), McCrudden (2008), and Kretzmer and Klein (2002).
15 ‘It is perfectly proper, he writes, for judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires. But
it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions
about how people live.’ United States v Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J, dissenting), cited by
Corso (2014), 95.
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persons as bearers of a deep sort of value,16 in addition to having reasons to see
them as holding valuable information concerning the impact of the legal regime
under constitutional scrutiny. Tis latter set of reasons concern the capture of
relevant information in a constitutional rights case, and, as such, are epistemic in
nature.17 Te former gives the judge a set of value-based reasons to pay attention
to the claimant that are sourced from the value (and standing) that the law deems
the claimant to possess.18
Te picture, thus far, looks relatively uncomplicated. At certain stages of
reasoning through a constitutional rights case, judges must make eforts to understand the experiences of the claimant under the impugned law or legal regime, and
for this, something like attention, or empathy (here posited as a facet of attention),
appear necessary. Tis prescription, however, is tricky and prone to misuse, and
this chapter raises several complications with respect to the judge’s ability to pay the
required attention to the claimant in a rights case. Tis is not to say that constitutional systems would be better served were judges required to altogether abandon
such eforts of attention, or related empathetic stances.19 Were this even possible,20
this would amount to an abdication of the role and responsibility assigned to the
judge in the constitutional systems outlined above.21 Nevertheless, it is only afer
getting down into the reeds with the question that the possibility of mapping out
this form of judicial reasoning emerges (and later, the possibility of holding judges
accountable for errors, or, more broadly, holding a legal system accountable for
laying claim to a normative or political good that it isn’t set up to deliver).

III. Errors of Attention
Some emotions precipitate or compound an inability to pay quality attention to
other persons, while other emotions play indispensable roles in fxing and holding attention on a subject.22 Simone Weil wrote of the difculty of witnessing the
sufering of another without either moving to obscure the other’s pain (ofen by way
of erasing their subjectivity, and/or lowering their status), or by entertaining some

16 ‘ Te Athenians adopted a legal principle of treating one another as equals, not because of any
moral conviction about real equality between them, but because such a principle made possible a form
of political community they could not otherwise have’ Waldron (2012a), 20. Tus, for our purposes
here, we can raise the question as to whether this political commitment mirrors a pre-existing moral
commitment.
17 See Elgin (2007) for a rich discussion on epistemology and understanding. See also Elgin (2020)
on emotions and salience (chapter three in this volume).
18 Ibid.
19 See White (forthcoming). See also Zipursky (2020) (chapter four in this volume).
20 On the subject of this not being possible, see Gardner (2008).
21 See eg White (2014). None of this precludes the possibility of a set of political or ethical reasons for
judges to either abdicate from their position and/or engage in civil disobedience or resistance.
22 Ibid.
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measure of self-satisfaction or voyeuristic pleasure.23 For Weil, the eforts of holding one’s attention on a subject, while actively and conscientiously resisting the
slide into more pleasurable (or simply less agitating) emotional states, constituted
an ethic.24 A disciplined resistance was therefore necessary to contend with those
habits of thought that worked to obstruct the practice of paying attention to the
other (or which facilitated only a selective sort of attention to certain others). Tis
section broadly outlines two diferent ways in which judicial eforts at paying
attention to the claimant might go awry such that the practice would amount to
something akin to a false or anti-attention. More perniciously, it suggests that
some judicial eforts might result in a publicly announced, and self-satisfed, claim
to attention, where the situation and perspective of the other had been wholly
obscured, colonised, misread or glossed over. Te forms of false or anti-attention
highlighted in the second case fow from the failure to recognise empathy’s structural selectivity, and vulnerability to bias and stereotype. In both cases, a disciplined
resistance to a known tendency to err requires judges to practice a politics of attention that puts emotions to work in their reasoning through a constitutional case.

A. Te Error of Taking Up Too Much Space
Sometimes I turn, there’s someone there,
other times it’s only me.
Bob Dylan, ‘Every Grain of Sand’ (1981)

Robert Solomon describes some emotions as having an intersubjective focus,
meaning that they aim at an understanding that sits, in a sense, somewhere
between the person experiencing the emotion and its subject.25 Solomon ofers
pity as an example of such an emotion, and uses this criteria of intersubjectivity
to illustrate how ill-versions of the emotion might arise. If the focus of pity, for
example, moves too close to the self and away from its subject, it risks becoming narcissistic and/or self-indulgent.26 If it moves too far away from the self,
the sufering of another might fail to register as it should or might have, causing
one, at times, to be obtuse, heedless, hard-hearted or cruel.27 Tis view echoes in
John Berger’s ‘Photographs of Agony’, where Berger emphasises the politics of an
attention that tends to slide back to the self.28 Berger writes how the mind can
move inwards to wrestle with questions of moral inadequacy afer witnessing a

23 Weil

(1956).
See, also, Murdoch (1993).
25 Solomon (2003), 223.
26 Ibid.
27 Where the afective component of pain and concern is traded for pleasure, the sufering of others
could be met with a form of gawking or titillation. See White (forthcoming).
28 Berger (1980).
24 Ibid.
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photograph depicting anguish or horror, in a process that efectively transmutes
the reality of the other into a private, general and abstract, existential question
that remains far removed from the concrete political realities that precipitated the
war, the attack, the mass drowning, the famine, etc. Where, for Berger, angst felt by
the witness does result in action, it is invariably token if it is aimed at relieving an
internal emotional or psychic discomfort as opposed to work aiming at political
recognition, confrontation or resistance.29
In each of these instances, the commitment to seeing the other as a distinct
other that is situated in time and place and worthy of attention, gets obscured
by self-serving mental processes that result in a form of inward-focused, false or
anti-attention. Solomon’s criteria of intersubjectivity helps elucidate this error
as the error of the self taking up too much space. Here we see clearly how this
error of attention is bound up with an error of recognition. Peter Goldie’s work
on the ironies and inconsistencies embedded in various conceptions of empathy
ofers further contour. Empathy is not our practice of interest, and much has been
written querying whether empathy is better cast as an emotion, as opposed to a
cognitive skill.30 Nothing turns here on the conclusion, though a form of empathy
motivated by respect and concern, interest or awe, might satisfy a defnition of
emotion that required an afective component, and would present as a facet of
this idea of attention that we’ve been working towards as it concerns an afectively
charged political desire to recognise and learn something about the other.31
Goldie distinguishes between a conception of empathy that involves a form
of perspective-shifing, from one that aims at an ‘in his shoes’ position-taking.32
While Goldie’s work does not address judicial reasoning, we can extrapolate from
his analysis to note several ways in which judicial attempts at empathy might
backfre. A perspective-shifing empathy would see a judge attempting to enter the
head of the individual alleging a rights violation, (‘what is it like to be this other
person’), whereas an ‘in his shoes’ form of empathy would have judges attempting to place themselves in the same position as the claimant (‘what would I have
done in this situation’).33 Goldie argues that the frst category of ‘empathetic

29 Ibid.
30 See

Kind (2020) (chapter ten in this volume). See also White (forthcoming).
Cooper Davis writes: ‘… how easy it is, even for people with the most egalitarian intentions,
to slip into imagining a political institution or community in terms of its more afuent and powerful
sectors … Assumption of a superordinate perspective is, of course, not only easy but also deeply consequential. It is important, but not ofen difcult, to avoid fallacious reasoning in public discourse. Te
difcult and ofen more consequential moves are made in the construction of premises rather than in
reasoning from them. And a great deal turns on whether those premises are chosen from a subordinate
or a superordinate perspective’. Cooper Davis (2009), 1378–79.
32 Goldie (2011), 302.
33 Goldie later introduces a third conception that involves an ‘imagining how it is’ for another person,
which would have the judge maintain their position while aiming to pay dedicated attention to the
features of another’s situation. As Goldie stresses, however, this form of imaginative thinking requires
an intimate knowledge of the other person (knowledge of them as a unique, almost idiosyncatic other),
an intimacy that seems wholly out of reach in the context of ajudication. Ibid.
31 Peggy
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perspective-shifing’ is unworkable beyond simple cases34 given that it is a
category that is ‘conceptually unable to operate with the appropriately full-blooded
notion of frst-personal agency that is involved in deliberation.’35 Tis suggests a
further normative problem concerning the assumption that one might easily take
over the thinking of the other, presuming an ease of access to their mind, reservoir
of experiences, and ways of seeing. Te idea that one might help oneself so easily
to the perspective of another suggests a lack of humility, and/or curiosity about
the other, which are ways of thinking that appear anathema to a genuine inquiry
into the impact of a law on the rights claimant. For, if the person in the well of the
court is so easily understood, and their processes of thinking so replicable, they
wouldn’t need to be listened to as the source of information about the efects of a
law – and this seems contrary to the respect that is meant to be attributed to the
claimant under our constitutional systems of interest. Tis also stands in explicit
tension with the emerging jurisprudence in discrimination law that stresses both
that laws can have disparate impacts on individuals and groups, and that facially
neutral laws can violate equality rights where they serve to exacerbate existing
vulnerabilities for historically marginalised persons and communities.36
Perspective-shifing empathy as a model for judicial reasoning seems to ofer
an insufciently complex picture of the person for it assumes that there are no
deep or difcult-to-access diferences among the experiences of persons or groups
under an impugned law. A related objection exists for the category of the ‘in his
shoes’ form of empathising, which risks minimising the politics and privilege of
imagining it possible to catapult one’s self into the situation of another person or
group under law, while claiming a steadfast ability to read the relevant context.
Prescriptions for judicial empathy must attend to the structural features of the
judicial role, including the social, political and economic power of judges, their
standing, immunities and hindsight privilege. Otherwise, such prescriptions serve
only to encourage impervious-to-stakes, fippant and fantasy-rich, imagined
excursions into the lives of others under law. For example, it was not long ago that
the Canadian Judicial Council recommended the unseating of a judge who, during
the course of a rape trial, attempted to put himself in the position of the victim,
ofering her a number of ofensive stereotypes and comments about what he
might have done in the same situation to resist sexual violence (ignoring, amongst
other things, her physical vulnerability vis-à-vis her attacker).37 Tis example

34 Goldie uses the term, ‘base cases’ to refer to those ‘where the empathizer has the same psychological
dispositions (including character and personality) as the target; where there are no non-rational infuences on the target’s thinking; where the target is not confused about his state of mind; and where the
target is not psychologically conficted in his deliberations’. Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 See eg Moreau (2010) and Moreau (2007).
37 In the Matter of an Inquiry Pursuant to s. 63(1) of the Judges Act Regarding the Honourable
Justice Robin Camp Report and Recommendation of the Inquiry Committee to the Canadian Judicial
Council.
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highlights some of the pernicious consequences of an unserious form of ‘in his
shoes’ empathising.38
Under either of the forms of empathy outlined above, the legal demand to
confront the claimant as a distinct ‘other’ worthy of respect and attention is both
diluted and obscured. What is needed as antidote is a practised politics of attention which includes the use of emotions to paint the other as worthy of a certain
inviolability, and/or gravity. Tis entails the conscientious wielding of emotions
like respect and awe to give adequate heed to the other, instead of basing one’s
legal fndings on what one thinks they might have thought, felt or done under
the same circumstances.
Tere is a related error that results in the claimant not only being obscured in
the process of judicial reasoning, but having selective excerpts of her experiences
co-opted into the service of a pre-conceived narrative schema. In the mid-1950s,
the poet and literary critic Randall Jarrell found himself lamenting the late poetry
of Wallace Stevens. A short piece in Jarrell’s collection of essays, Poetry and the
Age,39 found Jarrell at last able to characterise the error he felt emerging in Stevens’
late work. Jarrell charged Stevens with moving towards a form of ‘philosophical
poetry’ – Jarrell’s (derogative) term for using descriptions of things or persons in
the world in the service of positing a general truth. Te error for Jarrell consisted
in the failure to be open and responsive to specifcity, which had the efect of
rendering the self immune from being called up, or changed via a confrontation
with a particular person, event, object, or place. Jarrell thought this was a difcult
to error to spot, for it consisted in well-crafed descriptions of things (persons,
events, object or place) that weren’t, in the end, about them being real or seen or
confronted in the world, but, rather, about their being co-opted and fashioned
into a broader narrative account. Te objective of the description was to select and
use particular facets of the subject in the service of positing a general theoretical
understanding. Jarrell ofered the following description:
But Stevens has this weakness – a terrible one for a poet, a steadily increasing one in
Stevens – of thinking of particulars as primarily illustrations of general truths, or else as
aesthetic, abstracted objects, simply there to be contemplated; he ofen treats things or
lives so that they seem no more than generalizations of an unprecedentedly low order.
But surely a poet has to treat the concrete as primary, as something far more than an
instance, a hue to be sense, a member of a laudable category – for him it is always the
generalization whose life is derived, whose authority is delegated. …40

Jarrell’s characterisation of this move is useful for delineating a difcult-topinpoint ill-version of attention in judicial reasoning. For Jarrell, a ‘philosophical

38 For further critiques of our ability to read the emotions of others. See eg Bandes (2016); Feldman
Barrett (2017). On the difculty of reading emotions over time and place, see Williams, Shame and
Necessity (2008); Cotter (2017).
39 Jarrell (1955).
40 Ibid, 124–25.
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poetry’ sees the poet no longer paying the sort of attention required by the
practice at hand. Te insistence on using a specifc instance to draw out a general
theory entails a failure to remain open and attentive to the actual subject.
Reasoning of this sort is dismissive of the independent existence and status of
the subject. It also, for Jarrell, constitutes a betrayal of craf. In legal reasoning,
a corollary of this error would consist in a judge selectively employing some of
the claimant’s own evidence to confrm a previously held general understanding
of a purview of a right, for example, without ever having been open to a serious
reconsideration of the legal matters before the court. We might think here of a
judge dutifully displaying in the reasons for judgment some of the claimant’s
evidentiary record, or even drawing upon some of the claimant’s own language –
knowing on a pragmatic level that this could render a judgment less prone to
appeal, bolster its legitimacy, or ofer the impression of understanding, rigour
and/or compassion. Even more mundanely, judges might also include this sort
of mimicking language in their reasons because they understood it to be part of
their own technical practice of judgment writing. Jarrell’s identifcation of this
error of attention isn’t dependent on a malicious will but is, in fact, generally
committed in the service of one’s own (distorted) sense of craf. It is imperative
to notice here how language use masks the error, making it particularly challenging, if not nearly impossible, to discern. As such, judicial reasoning requires
a politics of attention to counteract this well-hidden but nevertheless pernicious
form of a false attention. In the absence of a politics of attention – that is, a form
of attention concerned with its own principled distribution – there is only a
rhetoric, a claim, and an illusion of attention.
A form of judicial attention that actively cultivated a sense of respect, or even
awe towards the claimant as a legal subject might work to resist this pull to obscure,
erase or co-opt their perspective into a pre-conceived narrative. Cynical judges
who say to themselves, ‘I’ve seen this before. I’ve seen you (as a type of person)
before’, betray core legal value commitments, and they do so by failing to pay
attention to the subject in their legal reasoning practices. In his Dewey Lecture at
Harvard Law School, Tomas Nagel came close to describing the phenomenology
of this politics of attention that we are piecing together here, when he said that
‘Each person with whom I interact presents me with the same stubborn and
impenetrable moral surface that I present to him …’.41 Tis points to the need to
develop practices of legal reasoning that actively reinforce the standing, respect
and/or dignity that the law has attributed to the claimant. Te two legal rationales for judicial attention are important here. Were empathy only required for
epistemic reasons relating to how the individual or group was impacted by the
impugned law then the judge could be permitted to sidestep any real attempt to
take the claimant seriously where information about the law’s impact was thought
to be otherwise available.
41 Nagel

(2015).
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B. Errors of Application
Te preceding section analysed the need to course correct against a series of errors
that judges might make in their attempts to pay the required form of attention to
the claimant in the hearing of a constitutional law case. Empathy can be cast as a
facet of attention and this section considers the tendency to empathise unevenly,
and selectively, and how this poses deep challenges for legal reasoning in a constitutional system committed to recognising something akin to the equal dignity of
persons.42 Most working defnitions suggest that empathy involves the attempt to
enter the mind of another, or to move closer to another’s experience of the world.43
Empathy can be defned as a facet of attention when it is motivated by an afective
respect or concern for the other. It is this form of empathy that can be said to facilitate the required practices of legal reasoning in the constitutional systems outlined
above44 as it reinforces the respect owed to the claimant, and cultivates a serious
interest in lived experiences under the impugned law.45
While this form of judicial empathy is required to adjudicate rights,46 it is a
practice of legal reasoning that is prone to errors of application.47 A politics of
attention is needed to remedy the structural selectivity of empathy. Tis requires
the work of a series of emotions (respect, curiosity, concern) to animate, motivate
and sustain the legal value-based commitments to seeing all claimants as deserving of attention, and capable of possessing valuable information about the impact
of the impugned law.
How empathy is triggered is an old question. Over 2500 years ago, in Book VII
of his Problemata, Aristotle set down a puzzle for empathy and imagination when
he queried:
Why is it that when we see anyone cut or burned or tortured or undergoing any other
painful sufering, we share mentally in his pain? Is it because nature is common to us all,
and it is this which shares in the suferer’s pain, when we see any of these things happening to him, through kinship with him? Or is it because, just as the nose and hearing

42 For

a powerful examination of a failure to accord equal dignity to all persons under law, see Blum
(2020) (chapter seven in this volume).
43 Ibid.
44 If empathy is defned solely as the ability to know or predict the minds of others, then there is
no defnitional component that rules out calling the sociopath, or the skilled emotional manipulator,
empathetic. For deeper discussion on this, see Hansberg (2020) (chapter nine in this volume). Some
philosophers of emotion reject the categorisation of empathy as an emotion for this reason. Te posited
working conception above contains an afective dimension, as well as a constitutive desire (to learn
about the other out of respect and concern) and, as such, could be plausibly categorised as an emotion
(see Solomon, 1977; Solomon, 2003), though nothing in the overall argument turns on this.
45 Whether this bears out as a matter of empirics is a separate question. Te aim of this chapter is to
clarify the emotional elements of the prescribed legal reasoning.
46 Forwarding a related claim, see Zipursky’s wonderful chapter on compassion and austerity in
judicial reasoning (2020) (chapter four in this volume).
47 Nevertheless, empathy remains a regular aspect in judicial reasoning. See Kind’s excellent chapter
(2020) (chapter ten in this volume).
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according to their faculties receive certain emanations, so also the sight does the same
as the result of things pleasant and painful?”48

Tis line of questions raises a series of others. Must a recognition of kinship or
equality always precede the ‘sharing of another’s pain,’ or might the witnessing of
another’s pain instigate or facilitate this recognition of kinship or equality. Tis
is a critical sequencing question. Lynn Hunt has argued for the latter position,
suggesting that, over time, literary depictions of pain and sufering have worked
to generate more inclusive conceptions of justice through empathy.49 Hans Joas
resists this view by using historical examples to illustrate how the pain of ‘the
other’ remained unseen and un-afecting prior to the recognition that they were
sacred or equal.50 While these views needn’t be mutually exclusive, the productive
potential of empathy in the law rests on the sequencing of pain and recognition
that the emotion is presumed to entail. A judge who empathised only with those
claimants whom they – consciously or unconsciously – understood to be part of
their in-group would be in serious error.51 As Martha Nussbaum writes,
Humanity does not automatically reveal itself to strangers. No placard hung on the
front of a fellow citizen announces that this one is a full-fedged human being (and not
a vile bug or piece of refuse). Seeing the shape of a human being before us, we always
have a choice to make: will we impute full equal humanity to that shape, or something
less? Only by imagining how the world looks through that person’s eyes does one get to
the point of seeing the other person as a someone and not a something.52

Critics have pointed to features of empathy that make it unsuitable for use in political decision-making, and from these critiques we can extrapolate several concerns
with the use of empathy in judicial reasoning.53 Empathy may be too intimate54 an
emotion to expect in such a formal setting, or where there are such clear power
dynamics at play. Paul Bloom has argued that the structure of empathy makes it
a poor guide for social policy, given that it operates most easily when the other is
thought to be like us or is found attractive (ie criteria that would clearly be anathema
to legal commitments to equality). Judges would undermine legal commitments to
equality were they to feel only pity, compassion or moral outrage over the unjust
treatment of the claimant because the judge felt a kinship towards them.55 It is
48 Aristotle

in Barnes (1984), 1371.
(2007).
50 Joas (2013).
51 Tis echoes the concern with deep-seated prejudice, which is generally accompanied by emotions
of contempt or enmity. Beliefs and extraneous emotions that contradict core legal values must be
excluded, to the extent possible, from judicial reasoning that is committed to equal concern and
respect. Whether this is, in fact, achievable is a pressing question. On unconscious bias, see Lane, Kang
and Banaji (2007).
52 Nussbaum (2004), xvii.
53 See eg Bloom (2014).
54 See Leighton (2007).
55 Recall the outrage over the sentencing of Stanford swimmer Brock Turner: see Koren (2016). Te
sentencing judge in that case found himself empathising with the accused (Justice Aaron Persky of the
Santa Clara Superior Court was also a Stanford alumnus and gave Turner a markedly reduced sentence,
49 Hunt
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ofen a concern over the partiality of empathy, and other emotions, that underlies
calls to remove their infuence from judicial reasoning. Such concerns are valid
but the prescription is misleading. We would not, for example, want a judge to feel
nothing when confronted with evidence of a rights violation.56 Rather, the aim
is to establish a boundary that excludes those emotions that do not easily extend
to all persons, and to cultivate political practices that work against certain habits
of thought and feeling that undermine commitments to equal protection under
the law. Despite its structural faws, the right version of empathy plays an indispensable role in judicial reasoning because it cultivates and reinforces a serious
interest in the lived experiences of others under the law.57 What is needed, then,
is an afectively-charged, serious attempt at understanding that aims at recognition to actively resist the errors of co-option, obstruction and selectivity outlined
above. Tis requires judges to summon, construct and/or revive an emotional state
necessary for reasoning through constitutional rights case before the court. Given
the pull of these errors, a neutral emotional state will result in legal reasoning that
is prone to error, and which violates its own legal-value based commitments to
showing equal respect and dignity to persons. Margalit stresses the problem of
indiference in moral life, and its evil. He writes: ‘Tere is not so much banality of
evil as banality of indiference.’58 Martha Nussbaum voices a related concern. In
her book Poetic Justice, she argues that we need to work to cultivate the necessary
empathy to practise justice in a world full of division, hatred and violence.59 Both
views highlight the need for the presiding judge to exercise empathy politically,
that is, conscious of distribution and conscientiously, in the judicial assessment of
the harms caused by a government act or legislative scheme.
Evidence of humiliation, exclusion, pain and degradation should alert the
judge and call up her attention. A cool cynicism, apathy or numbness would clearly
betray the respect owed to the claimant and the severity of the alleged rights violation. In a distinct but related vein, a judge who never felt anger, pity, compassion,
respect or indignation in response to evidence of a rights violation could not be
said to be reasoning in line with legal values that emphasised equal concern and

which seemed inconsonant with the crime of rape and representative of the privilege of confronting
the criminal justice system as a white, elite male). As such, empathy stood in strong contrast to the
commitment to equal treatment before the law. Tis case highlighted some of the pernicious features
of empathy that are well documented in Paul Bloom’s book (that we empathise most easily with those
who we consider most like us, etc). See Bloom (2016). Tis case is also discussed in Elgin (2020)
(chapter three in this volume).
56 Neutrality can signal a lack of respect or understanding. See, famously, Aristotle, ‘Nicomachean
Ethics’, in Barnes (1984), 1104b 15-30. See White (2014) and Zipursky (2020) (chapter four in this
volume).
57 One of Bloom’s central criticisms of the use of empathy in the construction of social policy is that
it ‘is narrow; it connects us to particular individuals, real or imagined, but is insensitive to numerical
diferences and statistical data’. Note that this concern is somewhat neutralised in the judicial setting,
where the focus is properly placed on an individual’s experience under the law. See Bloom (2014).
58 Margalit (1996).
59 Nussbaum (1997).
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respect. Te same is true for judges who never experience these emotions with
respect to certain groups of persons, delineated perhaps by race, socio-economic
class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, citizenship, age, physical ability, etc. Te failure
to respond emotionally to a legal wrong sufered by a certain group demarcated as
the ‘other’ has long been attributed to judgments about diferential status.60 One
of the harms of diminishing the humanity of a group is that this works to block
feelings of sympathy, solidarity, empathy or compassion with the victims, and so
too feelings of indignation or moral outrage at the law over its unjust treatment of
that group.61 A judge’s failure to recognise and respond to the pain and sufering of
others either in general or with respect to a particular group is evidence that their
reasoning betrays legal commitments to attribute a full and equal humanity to all
persons.62

IV. Addressing an Objection to a Judicial
Politics of Attention
We have thus far outlined a series of errors that judges might make when they seek
to pay attention to a claimant in a constitutional law case. While prone to error,
there are nevertheless legal reasons for judges to pay a particular form of attention to the claimant. An objection follows from this prescription – what are the
implications for the rule of law where if the judge succeeds in paying attention to
the claimant?63 Won’t the proscribed judicial politics of attention render the claimant’s subjective experience of the law determinative on the question of a potential
rights violation, thereby undermining rule of law type commitments (that the law
be general, knowable in advance, prospective, etc). Tis charge oversimplifes the
role of judicial attention in judicial reasoning. In a constitutional rights case, the
objective of judicial reasoning is to determine whether the impugned law violates
the claimant’s constitutionally guaranteed rights. An afectively rich practice of
judicial attention facilitates this inquiry, and while it pays heed to the emotions
and the subjective experience of the claimant, it renders neither determinative of
the constitutional question at hand.64
Emotions can play positive epistemic roles in judicial reasoning65 by gripping and focusing the attention66 of the presiding judge or judicial panel, thereby

60 See

eg Garland (1993).
eg Waldron (2012b). See also, the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning on hate speech in
Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11.
62 For an in-depth discussion on this, see White (2014).
63 See Elgin (2020) (chapter three in this volume) for a rich discussion on impartiality and impersonality in legal judgement vis-à-vis the rule of law criteria of generality.
64 White (2014). See also Zipursky’s authoritative work on compassion in judicial reasoning (1990).
65 I am grateful to Tomas Nagel for pressing for this clarifcation.
66 Brady (2013), 5.
61 See
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prompting a re-evaluation of the impugned law or government action. While it is
not the case that a claimant’s subjective experience of a rights violation will ever
be constitutive of a legal rights violation, a claimant’s evidence and testimony can
work to capture the attention of the judge or judicial panel and prompt them to
reappraise their understanding of the situations on the ground that should engage
existing rights protections. A claimant’s emotions can, at times, work to initiate a related emotional response in the judge, which ‘can motivate the search for
reasons that bear on the accuracy of their own initial assessment of some object
or event, and thus motivate the rational reappraisal or reassessment of that object
or event’.67 An emotion, for example, might begin with a strong physiological
response – such as the quickening heartbeat that is characteristic of fear – that
works to focus critical attention on the object of that emotion, inviting a process
of cognitive refection68 that can work to difuse, intensify or change the emotion
(we can think of fear moving to indignation, or laugher upon further refection,
for example). A person who has been taken to a secondary screening room at an
airport Customs and Immigration ofce and subjected to an arduous and demeaning round of questioning might shake, perspire and feel nervous or fearful at the
time. Aferwards, however, this same person might come to have a diferent set
of emotional reactions, such as anger or indignation, while thinking about this
episode, its particular features and politics, and perhaps even the emotions that
she experienced while undergoing it.69 As Peter Goldie suggests, we can think both
internally and externally about the emotional import of a past event.70 As in our
example, moving across these categories (from an internal to an external reference
point) can cause the emotional response to shif. Tis refection and processing is
motivated by the very structure of the emotion. Emotions aid thinking in this way
by setting up internal and external viewpoints. Similarly, we can have diferent
emotional responses to an event depending on whether we take a broad or narrow
view of it.71 An occurrence might be more painful (or irritating, or pleasing), for
example, when we recognise it to form part of a pattern of interactions. Robert
Solomon has likened this refective feature of emotion to a camera lens that is
capable of diferent resolutions. Looking at law, then, through a historical lens, we
can see how a claimant’s depiction of humiliation and/or degradation under law
may claim a history, rationality and validity that another instance does not.72
We might also think of the ways in which the emotions experienced by the
judge (or by individual judges sitting on a panel) hearing a case might be mediated
67 Ibid.
68 See

eg Robinson (2005).
do not wish to give the impression that there won’t be variations – wide ones, even – in how this
example might afect diferent groups in a society. Te interaction might rationally present as a threat
to a group that has been historically marginalised and/or victimised by public ofcials, while not experienced directly as such by others.
70 Goldie (2009).
71 Ibid.
72 ‘Debo justifcar lo que me hiere’ (Trans. by Rocio Lorca: I have to justify what wounds me). Tis is
the frst line on Jorge Luis Borges’s headstone. Cited in Berger (2006). See also Cooper Davis (2009).
69 I
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or unmediated.73 Tat is, the emotion’s object might be either the factual features
of the claimant’s situation under the impugned law (unmediated) or the claimant’s own subjective experience of that same situation, including the claimant’s
emotional experiences (mediated). With respect to the latter, the judge will be
concerned with the subjective experience of the claimant, and may focus, for
example, on the ‘testimony’ documenting the humiliation and pain that fowed
from the legal wrong of the alleged rights violation.74 Tis does not mean that the
emotions of the claimant are in any way determinative of a rights violation.75 Te
version of empathy outlined in this chapter serves as an evidence-gathering skill,
that supports the construction of the relevant factual matrix before the court, and
assists in interpreting the constitutional right in question (as well as justifed limits
to that right).
Consider the form of a trenchant dissent, written against a court majority
who, in the opinion of the dissenting judges, failed to see something imperative in the determination of a rights case. As Terry Maroney writes, dissenting
opinions written in this register are legion.76 While a dissenting judge or judicial
panel might feel moved to indignation for a variety of reasons, it is nevertheless useful to explore some distinctions. We could, for example, distinguish
between instances where the dissenter was indignant over (1) the belief that
the majority failed to altogether grasp the harm or wrong experienced by the
claimant in a rights case (set of, perhaps, by the majority’s cold appraisal of
certain facts), from those with their roots in (2) the belief that the majority,
while grasping the harm or wrong experienced by the claimant, nevertheless
failed to fnd that a right had been violated.77 In both cases, the absence of
certain emotional reactions in the judicial reasoning reveals, in the view of
the dissenters, an absent or poorly applied legal value. In the frst instance,
the failure to react with certain emotions to the evidence in the case calls into
question the majority’s understanding of the relevant factual matrix, as interpreted through the lens of the governing legal values (this brackets questions
of relevance and admissibility).78 Te reference to legal values here is intended
to set aside those instances in which a dissent appears to abandon the idiom of
law altogether, writing in indignation in a purely ethical register, for example, to
73 I am here using Del Mar’s useful distinction between mediated and unmediated emotions. Del Mar
(2017), 145–46. For a deep enquiry into the role of artefacts and imagination in legal reasoning, see Del
Mar (2020) (chapter thirteen in this volume).
74 Some have argued that it is better to describe empathy, not as an emotion (where it does not
involve a ‘feeling with’), but as a cognitive process of understanding the emotional states of others. See
eg Coplan and Goldie (2011) and Goldie (2011).
75 See also Elgin (2020) (chapter three in this volume).
76 See Maroney (2011), 629.
77 A third scenario would occur where a dissenting judge feels moved to indignation believing
that the majority was improperly swayed by the evidence to fnd a rights violation where one did
not exist.
78 Here the assumption is that the emotion-inducing evidence is relevant to the legal determination
at hand.
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admonish the majority’s reasoning. What remains is the charge that the majority
would have apprehended the relevant evidence diferently had it properly applied
the governing legal values. Another sort of epistemic function that emotional reactions serve is more pronounced in the second scenario, where we imagine the
dissent’s indignation fowing from the majority’s failure to interpret the right at
issue in light of the evidence. Tis does not ground the interpretation of the right
in the emotional reaction; rather, it highlights precisely how the experience of the
emotion pushes the judge or judicial panel to interpret the purview of the right in
question in line with the guiding legal value.79 Te strong emotional reaction of the
judge prompts a searching and sustained inquiry into whether the law or government act violates the right in question as interpreted through the lens of the guiding
value. Judicial attention fulfls an epistemic function here by pressing the judge to
see if the impugned law or government act violates a constitutional right, motivating the re-examination of the purview of the right. Tis is the second epistemic
function that emotions fulfl in judicial reasoning – the fagging, attentioncapturing function.

V. Conclusion
Legal commitments to equality and respect require judicial reasoning practices
that refect a politics of attention that reinforces a broad and deep, curious and
concerned understanding of how the impugned law has impacted an individual
or group. Tis judicial politics of attention works to critically engage with and
press upon the boundaries of the category of what constitutes a rights violation.
An afectively charged judicial politics of attention draws on emotions to animate
and reinforce legal commitments to equality and dignity, and works to attribute
a gravity80 and inviolability to the claimant. In Nagel’s terms, they work to cloak
the claimant with an ‘impenetrable moral surface’ such that judicial eforts to
understand a case don’t obscure, or run roughshod over, a claimant’s rightful legal
standing. An unafected, banal, or cynical read of the claimant will be insufcient
to guard against the habits of thought and feeling outlined above that would lead
judges to obscure, dismiss or selectively empathise with the claimant.
A political attention concerns itself with a principled distribution of
attention, and draws on emotions to generate and hold steady the respect
owed to the claimant under the strictures of the constitutional order. Where
a judge fails to consciously cultivate a political attention, they risk ofering only a frm of false or anti-attention that undermines legal values and
legal commitments. Calling up the right emotional frames for reasoning
through a case is difcult and careful work.81 Emotional motivation cannot be
79 See

Zipursky’s seminal work on this (1990).
eg Halbertal (2015).
81 See White (forthcoming).
80 See
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abandoned simply because it is difcult to get right, nor in the face of political
contestation over what laws or government acts constitute a rights violation. Iris
Murdoch held that curiosity was a matter of morality, agitating us away from
certainty toward truths previously unseen. Recognising, through adjudication,
instances of humiliation, exclusion and degradation made possible under law is
an urgent and critical matter. Te normative foundations of our constitutional
systems of interest set this objective for legal reasoning. In light of this, we cobble
together pieces for a judicial politics of attention, and take seriously our task of
setting to light the work of emotions (like respect, curiosity and humility) in resisting the pervasive forms of anti-attention that would prevent a judge from seeing
what the law has asked them to look for.
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